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ANNEXURE IXS.O.S. Questionnaire

- Q.1. What are the details of the initial penetration by JOHNNY which enabled the Germans to shadow CATARRH and to supply him with false information, e.g. the location of the German cruiser, "Blauer Engel", who was JOHNNY and over what period was the information maintained?
- A.1. The name JOHNNY is unknown to GISKES and HUNTMANN. It is known, however, that CATARRH was constantly associating with the Dutch Captain of the Reserve, Van Den BERG who had important connections with the port authorities in Rotterdam. It is possible, therefore, that Van Den BERG passed this information to CATARRH who in turn passed it to KREMER for onward transmission. Both GISKES and HUNTMANN deny that false information of an intelligence character was ever passed to Van Den BERG. RIDDERSHOF first made contact with Van Den BERG in December 1941. As far as GISKES and HUNTMANN know, RIDDERSHOF did not use the name JOHNNY. RIDDERSHOF was handled by Offs. KUP.
- Q.2. What are the details of the liaison between the Aste in France, Belgium and Holland? What exchange of information existed for the briefing of interrogators of captured agents?
- A.2. Initial interrogations by SCHREIBER, and, when necessary, by GISKES, took place at S.D. H.Q. at The Hague. Subsequent interrogation on codes was carried out by Offs. MEI at Breda prison. MEI was purely a code and cypher expert. Berlin, in 1942, directed that a regular exchange of data, based on information received from the interrogations of captured agents, should take place between Aste in Holland, France and Belgium. In addition each Aste sent an individual report on each interrogation to III.P-Berlin. Reports consisted of about one page of foolscap giving the following information:-
- a. Name and cover name.
 - b. Controlling organization of the agent.
 - c. Mission.
 - d. Short summary of training.
 - e. Precise of the interrogation.

As far as is known to GISKES there was no similar interchange of information between the various S.D. Stellen.

III.P-Berlin issued, about every three months, a summary of British Intelligence activities in other countries, e.g. Middle East, North Africa, Crete, Scandinavia etc.

Technical S/T interrogations were carried out by the Funk-Abwehr who reported to their main office in Berlin; when the Funk-Abwehr was withdrawn from Holland, these interrogations were conducted by the Fu-B-Stelle-Orpo, who also reported the results to their main office. Abtg. Funk-Abwehr, Berlin, issued a monthly circular which incorporated the information obtained from these two sources.

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ANNEXURE IX (contd.)

A. 2. (contd.)

Information on new sabotage devices was forwarded to Abtg. II-Berlin by the relevant Abtg. II-Stelle in the countries concerned. Any matters of special interest were incorporated in the 3-monthly III F-Berlin summaries.

MRY, at the beginning of 1942, had no knowledge of S.O.B. background and was compelled to build this up from his own interrogations. It is possible, however, that he may have received the results of interrogations of agents captured in other countries, through Sips channels.

Q. 3: What were the details of the notional capture and death of MARROW and his W/T operator?

A. 3: III F "captured and killed" MARROW and his W/T operator on 19.11.42. (message No. 2 from COCUMBER via TRUMPET refers).

The Germans thought that the absence of casualties might cause suspicion in London and, as they were under the impression that London might be intending to ex-filtrate MARROW, he and his operator were selected for notional extermination.

Q. 4: The reason for the sudden cessation of the SPINACH message?

A. 4: KRECHER, in his signal No. 3 of 7.4.43, suspended RCN traffic mentioning suspected treason in 'VICTORY' circles. Since VORRINK had been arrested shortly before this date and the Germans thought that news of this arrest would be bound to reach the U.K; as SPINACH had been carrying this traffic they deemed it advisable to shut him down.

Q. 5: What did the Germans know of GARROF?

A. 5: On 15.5.42, London, in CXC 17, told TRUMPET to make a rendezvous with GARROF. The address of this rendezvous was sent in a complicated code which was broken by the Germans. The address of the rendezvous was Boelge, Leidsehe Court, Leidsehe Plein, Amsterdam. At this time of course, TRUMPET was under control, as was also TURNIP. For some reason unknown to GISKINS or HUNTSMAN the Sips, who handled this affair, decided that TURNIP should keep the appointment. The latter, however, was able to warn GARROF, that his two companions were plain-clothes police, and he was able to escape through a lavatory.

Prior to the receipt of the message quoted above, the Germans had no knowledge of GARROF's existence, nor did they succeed in arresting him after his escape.

Q. 6: The two Anton de WILDES?

A. 6: a) Anton De WILDE & ADRIAN was the name employed by UFFA BODENS of III F Ant-Niederlande for his notional ex-filtration to the U.K. in May 1943. He was passed through to Paris by ARNO (see A. 7 & 8), where he was 'arrested' in a cafe in the Bvd. des Capucines, whilst in the company of the genuine British agent MARCEL. The latter, however, was uncollected.

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ANNEXURE IX (contd.)A. 6 (contd.)

b) VAN DER WAALS & DE WILDE & ANTON, was Haupt V-Mann of Krimrat. SCHREIEDER of the SD, The Hague.

This man was responsible for the penetration of the Kooa VOORINK group. In a message from London to BONI, No. 34 of 12.11.42, orders were given to contact a certain VENUS; the latter was a member of the Kooa VOORINK group and VAN DER WAALS, after making this contact, was able to penetrate this organisation. In order to inspire confidence VAN DER WAALS asked that a B.B.C. message should be broadcast, and this was done. This confidence having been obtained, Kooa VOORINK sent the 'VICTORY' messages through VAN DER WAALS, and these were transmitted on the BONI 11.

It is pointed out that this affair - the group being indigenous - was handled by SCHREIEDER, and III F merely loaned the BONI link for the purpose.

In the summer and autumn of 1943, black lists, distributed by one of the Dutch Resistance Groups, described VAN DER WAALS as being a notorious S.D. agent.

HUNTEMANN also declares that VAN DER WAALS was taken by Capt. ABEN (Camp OZO case) to see the British Military Attache in Stockholm. He is unable to give the date and this information is second-hand from SCHREIEDER.

In September 1944, SCHREIEDER told HUNTEMANN that "VAN DER WAALS in England sei und freiwillig herüber gegangen sei". HUNTEMANN had the impression that SCHREIEDER was considerably worried at this news. He also recollects that, possibly in 1943 VAN DER WAALS was notionally murdered by the SD as he was 'blown' throughout Holland.

Q. 7: Whether the BROADBEAN/GOLF escape line fitted into the general scheme of the Abwehr and what were the dividends they received from it?

A. 7: These two agents arrived in Holland on 2.2.43 and were duly arrested on landing. Interrogation established that their mission was to organise escape lines for ex-filtrées, etc. For this purpose they had been provided with blank French and Belgian identity cards and a large sum of French and Belgian money. The actual running of an escape line presented considerable difficulties to the Germans, since, had they given the impression to London that the lines were working satisfactorily, there would have been no excuse for making difficulties over the ex-filtrations for which London was constantly asking. In addition, a series of notional arrests on these lines would also have appeared suspicious. The policy therefore was to minimise as far as possible, the potentialities of the BROADBEAN/GOLF lines.

The only dividends accruing to the Germans were the addresses of safe houses and contacts sent by London, over the BROADBEAN/GOLF link. As for example the information provided in Nr. 2 to

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ANNEXURE IX (contd.)A.7 (contd.)

BROADBENT/GOLF dated 26.4.45 giving the address of a safe house and a password. It was found that the contacts given were, in most cases, of minor importance and no arrests, as far as GISKES and HUNTERMAN knew, resulted from this traffic, the policy being merely to keep observation and not to 'blow' the addresses or contacts. An exception to this was a house-marshal, at the address where WARON lived in Paris, believed to be in the Black Legion circuit, as it was thought that, in view of ADRIAN's 'wreck' no action would have appeared suspicious.

At a later date, which neither can remember, ARNAUD & ARNO, i.e. Uffz. CHRISTMANN, was sent to Paris to an address notified from London with a story that other ex-filtrees were to be expected shortly. On arrival, however, it appeared that London had asked for the ex-filtree of ARNO and the latter, willy-nilly, was sent along the line accompanied by a woman as far as Lyons. Here he came under suspicion, but managed to talk his way out of it and returned to Holland, where he reported the address of the house in Lyons. This address was passed to the Ast in Lyons and the place was watched, but apparently the organisers of the line had realised the implication of ARNO's visit and nothing eventuated.

All addresses of safe houses and contacts sent by London on the BROADBENT/GOLF link, were passed to the relevant Asts, but the results obtained were generally unknown to III F Holland.

Q.8: What was the true identity of the passeur ARNO or ARNAUD?

A.8: Uffz. CHRISTMANN, III F, Ass-Ministerlande.

Q.9: Details of the activities of Col. KOPPERT?

A.9: Col. KOPPERT was a man who had good connections with a few senior German officers, names unknown to GISKES and HUNTERMAN.

It appears that HUNTERMAN met KOPPERT 'by chance' in a train and commenced talking about resistance activities. It seems, however, that KOPPERT distrusted HUNTERMAN but put him in touch with Sgt. KNOFFERS. As far as GISKES and HUNTERMAN are aware, HUNTERMAN only met KOPPERT on a few occasions and was unable to produce anything of an interesting or interesting character.

The Germans, however, naturally expected to receive from KNOFFERS a great deal of information as to the activities and future plans of KOPPERT, after KNOFFERS had returned from the U.K.

Q.10: Administrative arrangements under which HUNTERMAN worked for Abwehr in both Holland and Belgium?

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ANNEXURE IX (contd.)
A. 10:

In the autumn of 1941, Uffz. KUP had come into contact with RIDDERHOF after the latter's release from prison. In December 1941 RIDDERHOF was receiving from III F a fixed salary of 200 guilders which by mid-1942 had risen to 300 guilders per month, and at the end of the same year, 500 guilders. By the summer of 1943 RIDDERHOF had become completely "blown" in Holland and left for Brussels, with the idea, so GISKES and HUNTEMANN state, of withdrawing from all GIs activities. Nevertheless he still drew his monthly salary from Ast-Niederlande. As far as GISKES and HUNTEMANN are aware, RIDDERHOF was never paid by Ast-Brussels but, naturally, was known there and he could rely on the Ast's help for procuring identity papers, passports and living quarters, etc.

His various addresses, as known to III F-Niederlande, were as follows:-

- a) Elaricum, N. Holland, near Silversum:
Korte Moedeweg 2. Frequently used, and relatives of his (by marriage) lived there.
- b) There was another address, obtainable from the local police, in Amhem. He was probably registered here under the name RIDDERHOF.
- c) Rue de Thronc, Brussels. (Nr. forgotten).
- d) In the spring of 1943 he lived for a time in various hotels in Spa.

Q. 11:

Details of the two NORDELF agents, alleged to be a British captain and a Dutchman, brought from Holland to Belgium, in the summer of 1944. The two agents are said to have agreed to co-operate with the Germans, but only against the Russians.

A. 11:

The two agents were EBENEZER and TRUMBAT. Details are given in statements by GISKES and HUNTEMANN at Annexure VI. Neither GISKES nor HUNTEMANN can imagine how MIERSMANN was aware of this incident.

Third Questionnaire Submitted by S.O.E.
Q. 1:

Was TOMBAT identical with Ter HAAKE (See P. 1, Section 3 of this report).

A. 1:

No.

Q. 2:

Who is ABOR?

A. 2:

ABOR is: Arnoldus Albert BAATSEN @ WATERGROSS.

Q. 3:

Escape of PARSHIP, CABBAGE and LACROSSE?

A. 3:

See statement by GISKES, Annexure VII.

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APPENDIX IX (cont'd.)Verbal Questions are Submitted by S.O.S. (cont'd.)

Q. 4: Was RIDDERHOF identical with CHERRY BRANDY or George BRANDY?

A. 4: RIDDERHOF, when making reports to III F on George BRANDY, was supposed to refer to him as SHERRY.

Q. 5: Radio-Dienst?

A. 5: Neither GISKES nor HUNTEMANN have any knowledge of this organization, nor have they even heard of it.

Q. 6: IS VI?

A. 6: Neither GISKES nor HUNTEMANN know a great deal about this organization. However, it is possible that it was penetrated by the Sipo, through LINDEMANS.

Q. 7: Explanation of the German spelling of the key-word "PRIJS" in A/978 from KALE?

A. 7: EBENEZER was certainly not being used to encipher, translate or transmit on the 25.4.43, when the word "PREIS" appeared in message A/978 from KALE via BROCCOLI. At this time EBENEZER was mentioned at Haaren and the suggested explanation of this incident by HUNTEMANN is as follows:-

Members of the Orpo frequently transmitted in the neighbourhood of 's Hertogenbosch, and on these occasions often visited the Haaren prison. It is possible, though unlikely, that one of them had given to EBENEZER the draft message and asked him to decipher it. EBENEZER may have learnt BROCCOLI's key word by eavesdropping on the central heating system, and thus have had the chance to insert the word "PREIS" in the message. HUNTEMANN thinks, however, that this would have been very unlikely as, almost always, messages were enciphered at the W-B-Station-Orpo, then at Driebergen, and taken to the place of transmission already enciphered. In addition, all enciphering and deciphering was subject to a double check done by two different members of the B-Station. Accordingly, no credible explanation for this incident can be offered by HUNTEMANN or GISKES.

At the same time it is emphasized that all matters connected with enciphering and transmission were dealt with entirely by the Orpo and HUNTEMANN and GISKES knew little about the procedure adopted. Neither possesses any technical knowledge of codes, signals, or W/T.

Custody of captured S.O.S. Agents.

In spring and summer of 1942, all captured agents were taken to the SS prison at Scheveningen. Interrogation generally took place in the prison, but in special cases agents were interrogated personally by SCHAEFER at the HQ's of the Sipo, Binckhoff, The Hague.

EBENEZER and THUMANN were detained for several weeks in the military prison at Scheveningen as they were being played back, and were actually transmitting. It was therefore necessary to prevent them coming into contact with other Dutch prisoners and their Dutch guards.

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ANNEXURE IX (contd.)Custody of Captured S.O.E. Agents (contd.)

In about September or October 1942, all NORDPOL agents were taken to the special prison at Haaren. From this date onwards all arrested agents were conducted straight to Haaren, where they were interrogated, except those who appeared to have received special missions, e.g. Johan GRUEN & BRUTUS and a female agent named FELIX & CHICORY, who were first interrogated at Binsenhof by SCHREIEDER.

After the escape from Haaren in December 1943 of PARSNIP, CABBAGE and LACROIX, all NORDPOL agents, with the exception of EBENEZER, TRUMPET and FELIX, were transferred early in 1944 to the prison at Assen, and thence at some later date, unknown, to camps in Germany.

In mid-September 1944, SCHREIEDER told HUNTEMANN that TRUMPET and EBENEZER had also been sent to Germany, and that they were at Sachsenhausen Camp. At the same time, SCHREIEDER professed ignorance of the whereabouts of the other NORDPOL agents. Nevertheless he promised to make enquiries, but H.I.P. were never informed of the result. As GISKES felt a special responsibility for EBENEZER and TRUMPET as a result of the promises that had been made to them, he ordered HUNTEMANN to visit them at this camp. An account of HUNTEMANN's visit is given at Annexure VIII.

A certain H. Istuf. WACHER was in charge of the prison at Haaren, which was also, at times, used as a detention prison for hostages.

Notes on S.O.E. Agents.

It must be emphasised that the actual handling of the agents after arrest was entirely an SI responsibility, and for this reason both GISKES and HUNTEMANN are not good sources of information on the behaviour and personalities of the captured agents; in fact, many of them were never even seen by GISKES or HUNTEMANN.

EBENEZER is described by HUNTEMANN as being crafty and moody. He was only prepared to co-operate as a result of a definite promise made that none of the agents caught through his treachery would receive the death penalty. The promise that his own life would be spared made no impression on him, and it was impossible to turn him by threats of this nature. He was absolutely convinced that London would be aware that he was operating under control within three weeks. In fact he stated that a certain Col. BLUNT had assured him that this would be the case before he left the U.K. Special pains were taken to school a B-Stelle operator in EBENEZER's transmitting idiosyncracies, as it was feared that if he should become aware of the seriousness of the position that his behaviour had entailed, he would, at no matter what cost, take steps to inform London. He never concealed his dislike of the Germans.

TRUMPET: Is described as being a man of little initiative and with a dislike for hard work. He appeared to be completely disinterested in his situation and HUNTEMANN had the impression that, even if free, he would have been a poor agent. During imprisonment he was subject to frequent fits of depression and for that reason HUNTEMANN arranged for him to share a cell with EBENEZER.

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ANNEXURE IX (Contd.)Notes on S.O.E. Agents (contd.)

CATARRH: Is described by GISKES as being a man of outstanding courage and determination. No promises or threats would induce him to provide information or to co-operate in any way. After the failure of an attempted escape he refused to give his parole not to escape again. Any information that he did provide, was given, when he was quite sure that it would do no harm to his cause.

PAULA (Pier WINDY): A female agent who behaved very well, and from whom it was almost impossible to gain information. When London proposed an address in The Hague for her contact, SCHREIEDER promised her her liberty if she would consent to act as an SD agent in making the contact. She refused SCHREIEDER's proposal, preferring imprisonment where, however, she was well treated, according to HUNTEMANN.

MARROW: Is described as a man of high ideals and great patriotism. HUNTEMANN however considered that his affection for his wife and child was such that he would never have been a good agent. Whilst under arrest he was constantly asking for news of his family. HUNTEMANN declares that he persuaded SCHREIEDER to send the wife a letter and money through an imaginary Dutch organisation, and the wife was allowed to send a letter back through the same intermediary.

WATERCRESS: Is described by HUNTEMANN as a bad character who voluntarily spied on his fellow prisoners at Mearns and reported on them to the SD. Through him, many written messages from one prisoner to another found their way into the hands of the SD. At a later period he fell into disfavour with the SD who found papers indicating his intention to escape.

BEETROOT & VANSITTARD (BEETROOT): Former members of the Marechaussee. Described as excellent agents who, at initial interrogations, convinced the Germans that they were people of very minor importance. When, in a signal from London at a later date, it was made clear to the Germans that the pair were "EUREKA" instructors, they were further interrogated, but both claimed to have forgotten their knowledge of the subject and the Germans were obliged to send the first set they captured to Berlin, for expert examination, before they could work it.

PARSLEY: Described as a good agent from whom the SD could get nothing for a long time. At his first interrogation after capture, he insisted that a W/T message should be sent to London stating: "ELVIRA reached the station 57 minutes late". This message appeared suspicious to GISKES and HUNTEMANN, and in order to obviate having to transmit it, PARSELY had to be notionally killed.

KALE & CAULIFLOWER: Described by SCHREIEDER to HUNTEMANN as being good trustworthy men who gave nothing away of any importance.

BROADBEAN: Volunteered to work for the Germans. His offer was refused as HUNTEMANN believed that he only made the offer with a view to future escape.

TURNIP: Showed considerable resource in warning CARROT. (See A.5 of S.O.E. Questionnaire)

SCHREIEDER expressed the opinion that the quality of agents sent, progressively deteriorated.